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Abstract 22 
 23 
The Meaning Maintenance Model posits that individuals seek to resolve uncertainty by searching 24 
for patterns in the environment, yet little is known about how this is accomplished. Four studies 25 
investigated whether uncertainty has an effect on people’s cognitive functioning. In particular, 26 
we investigated whether meaning threats lead to increased working memory capacity. In each 27 
study, we exposed participants to either an uncertain stimulus used to threaten meaning in past 28 
studies, or a control stimulus. Participants then completed a working memory measure, where 29 
they either had to recall lists of words (Studies 1, 2), or strings of digits (Studies 3, 4). We used 30 
both a frequentist approach and Bayesian analysis to evaluate our findings. Across the four 31 
studies, we find a small but consistent effect, where participants in the meaning threat condition 32 
show improved performance on the working memory tasks. Overall, our findings were consistent 33 
with the hypothesis that working memory capacity increases when people experience a meaning 34 
threat, which may help to explain improved pattern recognition. Additionally, our results 35 
highlight the value of using a Bayesian analytic approach, particularly when studying 36 
phenomena with high variance.  37 
38 
 3 
Introduction 39 
 40 
For the most part, our worlds unfold as we expect. It rarely snows in the summer, fire 41 
tends to be hot, generally our friends don’t try to hurt us, and when we go to bed at night, we 42 
expect to wake up in the morning. But on occasion things may happen that don’t make so much 43 
sense. A variety of theoretical perspectives have emerged to account for how people react when 44 
these unexpected events occur (for reviews see [1–3]). In particular, the Meaning Maintenance 45 
Model (MMM; [1,4]) proposes that people have a need to maintain a sense of meaning. The 46 
“meaning” in this model refers to expected relations – that is, the ideas that we can connect to 47 
any cognition, emotion, or behaviour. So, for example, what one’s alma mater “means” to 48 
someone is all the ideas that they can relate to it – their memories of friends, classes, the school’s 49 
reputation, the opportunities that it afforded, parties, the food in the dining hall, and so on. If any 50 
of these relations changed, then so would one’s perceived meaning of their school. Moreover, if 51 
some dramatic unexpected event were ever to happen at one’s school, such as a school shooting, 52 
or an embarrassing scandal, then people might experience a “meaning threat,” as they would 53 
struggle to integrate this new piece of information that is at odds with their existing 54 
understanding of their school.  55 
There are a variety of experiences that can constitute meaning threats. For example, the 56 
experience of interpersonal rejection entails the severing of relationships between people [5,6], 57 
encounters with perceptual anomalies suggest that the world is different than one understands 58 
[7,8], surrealist art juxtaposes contradictory elements together in unfamiliar ways [9,10], feelings 59 
of personal uncertainty or cognitive dissonance diminish one’s confidence in one’s meaning 60 
frameworks [11–14], an awareness of conflicting attitudes undermines a sense of order [15], 61 
feelings of a lack of control deprives one from the sense that one’s actions impact the world 62 
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[16,17], and reminders that one will some day die makes one consider how all the relations that 63 
they have with the world and others will someday inevitably come to an end with their death 64 
[18–20]. Meaning threats can result from a vast variety of situations and experiences. 65 
Responses to Meaning Threats 66 
 67 
The MMM maintains that people seek to remain in a state of homeostasis where the 68 
world appears to them in ways that are consistent with their expectations. When people 69 
encounter events that are unexpected or hard to process, they experience some unconsciously 70 
perceived aversive arousal that prompts them to restore a feeling that the world makes sense 71 
again [21]. A variety of different palliative responses to restore meaning have been identified. 72 
One response is to assimilate the anomaly such that it no longer seems anomalous [22–24]. 73 
People may preserve their existing meaning frameworks by assuming that the encountered 74 
anomaly is not anomalous at all, such as how a black queen of diamonds might appear to actually 75 
look red [25], or that an innocent person beset by a horrible tragedy may be seen as somehow 76 
deserving it, thereby preserving a belief in a just world [26]. A second commonly documented 77 
response to encounters with the unexpected is that people may accommodate their meaning 78 
frameworks, by modifying their understanding of the world to take into account the anomalous 79 
event [22,27]. For example, after agreeing to help an experimenter by telling the next participant 80 
that a really boring task was actually quite interesting, one might alter their meaning frameworks 81 
to convince themselves that they actually enjoy mindless, repetitive tasks [28], or upon learning 82 
that ingesting a bacterium causes an ulcer a doctor may revise her existing theory about the 83 
nature of ulcers (see [29]). Theories of assimilation and accommodation have been common in 84 
many different accounts of meaning (e.g., [22–24,27,30]); however, these responses to 85 
unexpected events each have their respective shortcomings. Assimilation is often not complete – 86 
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for example, even though participants might not be able to consciously notice that a set of 87 
playing cards includes reverse-colored cards, they still show evidence that the anomalous cards 88 
are bothersome to them [8]. And accommodation can be cognitively demanding— when people 89 
are presented with evidence that challenges their understanding of the world, it is hard for them 90 
to rethink their entire worldview [31] but it is potentially easier for them to dismiss the evidence 91 
outright. Hence, in the immediate aftermath of an encounter with an anomaly, people may not 92 
have the ability to completely assimilate or accommodate the meaning threat. 93 
 Given the limits of assimilation and accommodation in resolving any discovered 94 
anomalies, the MMM has explored other psychological reactions to unexpected encounters that 95 
go under the broad rubric of fluid compensation [32,33]. When faced with an anomaly that can’t 96 
be fully assimilated or accommodated, people may instead compensate through an entirely 97 
separate palliative process that serves to dispel the unpleasant arousal caused by the perceived 98 
meaning threat. The most studied of these is affirmation. That is, when people have detected a 99 
shortcoming in a meaning framework they may increase their commitment to another, entirely 100 
separate, meaning framework [1]. Though this does nothing to resolve the original offending 101 
anomaly, it does allow the individual to regain a general sense of meaning. There are many 102 
examples of affirmation in the literature across a broad array of different theoretical paradigms. 103 
Dozens of studies from the terror management literature find that when people contemplate their 104 
own mortality they subsequently engage in cultural worldview defense, by which they increase 105 
their commitment to their beliefs about the world [34]. When people are made to feel uncertain, 106 
they subsequently engage in more intergroup discrimination (e.g., [35]). When people act in a 107 
manner dissonant with their attitudes, they will show enhanced polarization of unrelated attitudes 108 
towards affirmative action [13]. Or when people read a short story by Kafka that violates their 109 
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expectations, they come to identify more with their culture [9]. All of these various findings 110 
cohere in revealing increased commitment to previously held beliefs following an encounter with 111 
a meaning threat. 112 
Studies of affirmation share one feature in common: following a threat, participants are 113 
provided with an alternative meaning framework that they can affirm. However, what happens if 114 
participants are not provided with any such alternative framework? A number of studies find 115 
evidence that when people feel uncertain they exhibit heightened attentional vigilance for new 116 
information [17,36–38]. Moreover, some studies have found that people show a heightened 117 
ability and/or motivation to search for patterns in the environment, in an effort to discover new 118 
meaningful relationships (e.g., [15,17]). This form of threat compensation has been termed 119 
abstraction [4,38].  120 
Some evidence for abstraction comes from Proulx and Heine [38] who observed that after 121 
reading a surreal short story by Franz Kafka, participants performed better on an implicit 122 
grammar learning task compared with those who read a control story. Without knowing that they 123 
were doing so, people attended more to the rules of the artificial grammar following the surreal 124 
story, enabling them to later identify letter strings that conformed to the grammar. In a follow-up 125 
study, Randles et al. [39] showed that even when a threat went undetected (in this case, 126 
participants were subliminally presented with incoherent word pairs), participants were still 127 
better able to learn an artificial grammar than when presented with coherent word pairs. 128 
Although abstraction seems to fit within the MMM’s framework of ‘meaning-lost, meaning-129 
restored’ [4], much of how it works remains poorly understood. One possibility is that when 130 
people are made to feel uncertain, they are more prepared to make sense of a changing 131 
environment. They should be in a heightened state of arousal as they try to make sense of what is 132 
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happening around them. To the extent that this is the case, we would expect that uncertainty 133 
would prompt temporary increases to working memory capacity. This paper describes studies 134 
designed to test this hypothesis. 135 
Error Evaluation, Conflict Detection, and Meaning 136 
 137 
One way to understand the mechanisms underlying abstraction is to consider what we 138 
know of the brain systems that handle cognitive conflict. Converging lines of neuroscience 139 
research reveal that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) responds to detected conflicts or errors 140 
in processing [40,41]. Though there is widespread disagreement about the specific role of the 141 
ACC, which may be implicated in a variety of other cognitive or affective processes that go 142 
beyond our current focus—for example, pain [42], social pain [43] distress more generally 143 
[42,44,43], and others (see, e.g., [45,46,47])—there is firm evidence that the ACC is activated by 144 
conflict monitoring [48,2]. Specifically, when people perform complex tasks, the ACC triggers a 145 
series of responses in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) that lead to greater executive functioning [49]. 146 
The two systems work in concert to help in the detection and correction of processing errors, 147 
with the ACC performing a conflict monitoring role and the PFC performing a cognitive control 148 
role [40]. This signal appears to enhance cognitive control, as the strength of ACC activation in a 149 
preceding trial predicts reduced reaction time and errors on a subsequent trial, as well as reduced 150 
ACC activation and increased activation of the prefrontal cortex (a region associated with 151 
cognitive control; [50]). In other words, detecting an anomaly that leads to error triggers greater 152 
control and greater expectation that anomalies will occur, which in turn reduces both ACC 153 
activation in response to anomalies and the likelihood of making an error. This is the process that 154 
we speculate is most at play during abstraction, though we acknowledge that meaning threats 155 
produce a variety of other responses (for example, affirmation) that may also result from 156 
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activation of this neural region; indeed, much of the threat defense literature agrees that 157 
anomalies elicit anxiety, or other negatively-valenced experiences (see [2,12]) and often cite the 158 
ACC as the origin of this response (e.g., [51,12,2]). 159 
Research from a variety of different paradigms reveals that encounters with meaning 160 
threats lead to greater activation in the ACC (for reviews, see [2,4]). For example, studies find 161 
increased activation in the ACC when people encounter inconsistencies that arise either through 162 
cognitive dissonance [52,53] or behaving at odds with one’s self-concept [54]. Likewise, when 163 
people are led to consider how they are going to die someday – perhaps, the ultimate meaning 164 
threat [20,55] –  they similarly show enhanced ACC activation [56].  165 
In addition, some converging evidence for the similarity in neural responses to various 166 
kinds of meaning threats comes from research where participants ingest either a painkiller, such 167 
as acetaminophen, or a placebo. After consuming a painkiller participants show less activation in 168 
the ACC following interpersonal rejection [57] or when making errors in an Error-related 169 
Negativity paradigm [58]. Likewise, consuming painkillers leads to weaker defensive reactions 170 
to mortality salience and uncertainty manipulations [10], as well as less dissonance reduction 171 
[59] . The latter effects are theorized to arise from the diminished ACC activation following the 172 
consumption of painkillers. 173 
Taken together, these studies indicate that a variety of meaning threats lead to heightened 174 
ACC activation. We suggest that this activation increases people’s propensity to attend to events 175 
in their environment. Indeed, more general principles of threat defense also support our 176 
supposition that expectancy-violating events elicit attentional control. A long-standing concept in 177 
biopsychology is the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), which is theorized to manage the 178 
anxiety and avoidance that accompanies conflict detection [60,61]. The BIS is activated when 179 
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there is a threat that causes people to move from a state of approach to anxiety and risk 180 
assessment [62,63]. It is believed to rely on activation in the ACC [64] as well as neural 181 
substrates associated with anxiety like the amygdala and septo-hippocampal system [60,65,66]. 182 
Activation of the BIS is associated with arousal in response to negative or potentially life-183 
threatening events, which in turn leads people to pay more attention to their environment [60,67]. 184 
However, it has been proposed that the BIS is activated by surprising or uncertain stimuli, in 185 
addition to negative stimuli [60]. Therefore, we posit that meaning threats produce BIS 186 
activation, which in turn leads people to engage in greater attentional control. 187 
Given that ACC activation has been found to predict executive functioning [50,68,69], 188 
and given that theories of the BIS suggest that conflict detection is associated with increased 189 
vigilance [60], it follows that meaning threats might lead people to engage in more careful 190 
processing of stimuli in their environment. We sought to test this hypothesis by measuring 191 
performance on tasks that measure executive functioning. 192 
Working Memory Capacity and Cognitive Control 193 
 194 
One core executive function is working memory, the cognitive process associated with 195 
holding information in mind and manipulating it [70,71]. The prevailing view is that working 196 
memory includes both a storage component and an attentional control component [72–74]. It is 197 
this second component that leads us to believe that working memory may be one of the resources 198 
recruited when managing uncertainty. 199 
The attentional control component of working memory, referred to as the central 200 
executive, is what allows individuals to stay focused on task-relevant information and selectively 201 
ignore task-irrelevant information [75]. Investigations of the constructs underlying working 202 
memory capacity (e.g., [74]) as well as neural imaging studies (reviewed in [75]) suggest that 203 
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conflict detection and conflict resolution are critical features of working memory capacity. 204 
Indeed, the ability to suppress competing information is essential to performance on working 205 
memory tasks, which typically involve completing two activities simultaneously and switching 206 
attention between them (see [76]). Furthermore, there is general agreement that the ACC—the 207 
area of the brain most associated with meaning threats —is implicated in the aspect of working 208 
memory that involves suppressing competing information [77]. Therefore, stimuli that make 209 
people feel uncertain may activate the same conflict resolution process that is activated during 210 
working memory tasks. 211 
The MMM is not the first model to forward a hypothesis about the effect of threat on 212 
attention. Among them is the Unconscious Vigilance Model (UVM; [37]) such that individuals 213 
experience heightened reactivity to affective targets after experiencing a discrepancy. This 214 
heightened vigilance is not theoretically related to motivations like relieving anxiety, but simply 215 
facilitates appropriate responding to potentially threatening events [37, 2]. Though it may follow 216 
from the UVM that working memory capacity increases after a discrepancy under some 217 
circumstances, this model has no explicit prediction about people’s responses to targets that are 218 
not affectively charged. Jonas et al. [2] proposed a more general model of threat defense, 219 
suggesting that the mechanism by which individuals respond to threat is through the behavioral 220 
inhibition system (BIS), which is activated during the initial discrepancy detection, and is 221 
followed by approach-oriented behavior mediated by the behavioral activation system (BAS). 222 
Like the MMM, this model predicts that threats can increase accuracy in information processing, 223 
and that this represents a general increase in vigilance rather than targeted efforts to resolve the 224 
threat.  225 
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There are also models that may lead to the opposite prediction: that uncertainty decreases 226 
working memory capacity. For example, stereotype threat, which according to some 227 
characterizations originates from a conflict between self-schemas, decreases working memory 228 
capacity when individuals are required to engage in task-relevant behaviour (see [78,79]). On the 229 
other hand, we are not predicting that uncertainty makes people more focused on task-relevant 230 
problems. The predictions that derive from the MMM are relevant to people’s global processing, 231 
rather than their capacity to remain focused on the task at hand. In fact, there is evidence 232 
suggesting that when the source of uncertainty does not resolve itself quickly, uncertainty can 233 
draw attention away from the present goal and towards more distal goals (e.g., [80]) which is 234 
theorized to explain people’s tendency to affirm unrelated schemas when more proximal 235 
strategies are unsuccessful (see [2]). For this reason, we cannot claim that uncertainty always 236 
enhances people’s ability to solve problems. Depending on the problem of interest, it may 237 
actually inhibit this ability. The current topic of interest is how working memory generally 238 
increases, rather than specific targeted efforts to resolve the source of uncertainty.  239 
Based on current evidence from research in uncertainty and cognitive control, we 240 
hypothesize that threats to meaning result in greater executive functioning, and specifically, 241 
increased working memory capacity. This may lend some further context to the finding that 242 
pattern learning increases following a meaning threat. Furthermore, it would be consistent with 243 
the claim that the ACC and PFC are recruited to resolve uncertainty. We propose that uncertainty 244 
triggers a series of responses that lead to increased working memory capacity and more effortful 245 
thinking. 246 
In the following sections, we outline our results using Bayesian statistics as well as a 247 
more traditional frequentist approach. One benefit of Bayesian analysis is that it allows us to test 248 
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whether there is good evidence for the null hypothesis, in addition to the alternative hypothesis. 249 
A traditional frequentist approach does not allow researchers to determine whether their findings 250 
support a null hypothesis. This affects both the accuracy of the inferences people draw from their 251 
findings, and their likelihood of establishing a point estimate of the true effect size if one exists 252 
[81].  253 
Bayesian statistics are especially useful for updating information with more data, 254 
producing cumulative evidence for a model [82]. For this reason, Bayesian statistics empower 255 
researchers to correctly interpret failures to replicate [83,84]. Not only are p-values more likely 256 
to produce significant findings when the null is true; they also are likely to produce 257 
nonsignificant results despite that there is a true effect [85]. Bayesian analysis is particularly 258 
well-suited to the present research because of the many conceptual and direct replications we 259 
conducted. This presents us with a unique opportunity to estimate the size of our effect using 260 
Bayesian statistics, evaluating support for our theoretical perspective as well as support for the 261 
null. 262 
Materials and Methods 263 
 264 
Study 1 265 
 266 
This research was granted approval by the University of British Columbia Office of 267 
Research Services Behavioural Research Ethics Board. The approval code for this research is 268 
H09-02437. Written consent was obtained for studies conducted in-lab, and for studies 269 
conducted online over Amazon's Mechanical Turk, consent was obtained in the form of a 270 
checked box. 271 
Participants were undergraduate students who volunteered in exchange for course credit 272 
(N = 107). Mean age was 19.89 (SD = 4.03), sample was 80.4% female, 54.2% East Asian, 273 
 13 
22.4% European ancestry, and 23.4% other cultural backgrounds. The study took place on a 274 
computer, where participants first completed a meaning threat as the manipulation, followed by 275 
the working memory measure. 276 
Sensible-senseless word priming 277 
This task was designed to subliminally present participants with word-pairs that they had 278 
never seen before, and that violated common rules of language, such as Magic-Softly. While this 279 
inconsistency should be perceived as a threat to meaning, it is also likely easily resolved, so 280 
word-pairs were presented at near subliminal exposures. This task has previously been shown to 281 
cause compensatory affirmation and improved ability on an implicit pattern-learning task [39].  282 
Working memory measure 283 
The working memory task was taken from Schmader et al. [78]. Participants were told 284 
they would be given single words, which they would need to remember and recall after a number 285 
of trials. They would also be shown sentences, where they would need to count and report the 286 
number of vowels. Participants completed these alternating trial cycles for 4 to 6 repetitions, 287 
after which point they would be asked to recall all the single words, and then forget them for the 288 
next round. There were 12 rounds with 60 trial-pairs in total. Participants were scored on the 289 
proportion of single words correctly remembered. Across all studies, participants were excluded 290 
from our analyses if they took 10 minutes or under to complete the working memory task, or if 291 
they took over 30 minutes. For online studies, we also included a quality check to ensure that 292 
participants were not writing down the number strings. This was a 12-digit number that 293 
participants would not be able to recall with memory alone. Participants who were able to 294 
correctly respond to this question were excluded from our analyses. 295 
Procedure 296 
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Participants first provided written consent using either a physical consent form for studies 297 
conducted in-lab, or a digital consent form for studies conducted on Mturk. They were then told 298 
that they would see a number from 1-9 (excluding 5) and would then be asked whether the 299 
number was even/odd or high/low. For each trial, a fixation cross was presented for 1000ms, 300 
followed by the number for 356ms, a randomly jittered blank space for 400-700ms, the 301 
subliminal stimulus window of 30ms, a 200ms static block meant to serve as a backwards mask, 302 
and finally the participant’s question concerning the number. Participants in the control condition 303 
were presented with no subliminal stimulus for the first ten trials, followed by 20 trials of 304 
sensible word-pairs (e.g. Cheese-Cake), then a 2nd set of 30 trials following the same order. The 305 
meaning threat group received the same stimuli, except that trials 21-30 and 51-60 contained 306 
senseless word-pairs (e.g. Bull-Left). Senseless word-pairs were created by recombining the 307 
sensible pairs presented in the control condition. Scripts to run the experiment in Inquisit are 308 
available in the SOM. 309 
Study 2 310 
 311 
Study 2 is a conceptual replication of Study 1. We changed our participant pool to 312 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mturk) to gather a larger sample (N = 431). Mean age was 33.55 313 
(SD = 11.91), sample was 64.4% female, 80.0% White, 5.3% Black or African American, and 314 
13.6% other ethnicities.  315 
We changed the meaning threats to include both a mortality salience condition, and a 316 
"reversed cards" condition. The former involved writing about death, while the latter involved 317 
playing blackjack online, where halfway through some of the suit colors on the cards are flipped 318 
(red to black or black to red). We also included a condition where participants experienced both 319 
meaning threats. Additionally, we increased the difficulty of the working memory task. This was 320 
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done because exploratory analysis of the DV in Study 1 indicated most people answered the 321 
earliest and easiest questions perfectly, with very little variation between groups. 322 
Study 3 323 
 324 
Participants were students who volunteered in exchange for course credit (N = 174). 325 
Mean age was M = 20.86 (SD = 3.91), sample was 83.9% female, 47.1% East Asian, 24.7% 326 
White, 12.6% South Asian, and 15.6% other cultural backgrounds.  327 
Study 3 uses the same manipulations as Study 2, but we introduced a new DV. After the 328 
manipulation, participants are given strings of digits that they must remember and type back in 329 
backwards. For example, a participant might be presented with 4 - 6 - 3 - 5- 6, and would need to 330 
type 6 - 5 - 3 - 6 – 4 [86].  There were 18 trials of this task, and responses were scored according 331 
to the proportion of correct answers participants provided. Digits are presented one at a time with 332 
accompanying audio. This study was run in-lab with undergraduate student participants. 333 
Study 4 334 
 335 
 Study 4 is a direct replication of Study 3 using an Mturk sample (N = 348). Mean age was 336 
M = 33.3 (SD = 11.3), sample was 62.2% female, 79.0% White, 7.2% Latin, and 13.8% other 337 
cultural backgrounds.  338 
Results 339 
 340 
Study 1 341 
  342 
We analyzed the data across our studies using two distinct approaches. First we present 343 
the conventional approach, regressing score onto condition (analogous to a t-test). The second 344 
approach involves a Bayesian analysis, where we estimate the distribution of the posterior 345 
likelihood for the effect size, based on initially relatively flat priors but updating through the 346 
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studies. The dependent variable is standardized for analysis, making it easier to compare models 347 
across studies and update the prior distributions for the Bayesian analysis moving forward. 348 
 Total sample size was N = 107 (control = 51, threat = 56; no participants were removed). 349 
Control group mean score and SD are .68 (.17), meaning threat group values are .72 (.14). The 350 
conventional statistical test for condition, B = .25[-.13, .62], p = .21, indicates failure to reject the 351 
null. For the Bayesian analysis, we assigned priors as follows: the intercept was defined with a 352 
mean based on the normal distribution, and a standard deviation uniformly distributed from 0-2. 353 
These priors reflect our knowledge of the mean and standard deviation (since the data have been 354 
normalized). The prior estimate of the effect for condition was normally distributed around 0 355 
with a SD of 1, implying that the effect lies somewhere within a d +- 2; a sensible opening 356 
assumption for behavioral experiments given that most effects would not lie outside of this 357 
range. The prior is slightly biased towards a d =0, but is flexible enough that it is essentially flat 358 
for most reasonable values. Using the "rethinking" package in R [878], we ran a Bayesian 359 
regression model, and found a similar effect, B = .23[-.14, .60]. As a first study, these results are 360 
inconclusive, with both approaches yielding similar interpretations (see Fig 1). Moving to study 361 
2, however, we have stronger expectations for the effect, namely that it is either zero, or that if it 362 
exists, it is likely small. We can update our priors for the next study by simulating a posterior 363 
distribution based on our expectations. This new prior is thus somewhat akin to a directional test, 364 
in that the model is biased against negative effects. However, it is also biased against effects 365 
larger than about .60, and in exchange is somewhat biased in favor of seeing a small but positive 366 
effect as more likely. 367 
 368 
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Fig 1. Prior and posterior distribution of the effect size. Red distribution is the prior 369 
probability of the effect, green is the posterior distribution which accounts for study data. Solid 370 
region represents the 95% probability window, shaded regions are outside this window. Results 371 
of study 1 indicate that effects larger than .6 are very unlikely. There is still high uncertainty 372 
regarding whether the true effect size is zero, or small but decidedly non-zero. 373 
 374 
Study 2 375 
 376 
 Sample size, mean, and standard deviation for each group on the working memory task 377 
were as follows: Control M = .72, SD = .19, n = 104; mortality salience M = .74, SD = .20, n = 378 
112; cards M = .73, SD = .17, n = 90; both meaning threats M = .78, SD = .16, n = 125. Twenty-379 
three participants were removed because of technical problems, because they failed one of our 380 
various quality checks, or because admitted cheating on the working memory task in the 381 
debriefing, or because they noticed the color-reversed playing cards in the blackjack game. 382 
Though 55 participants indicated that they noticed something unusual about the blackjack game, 383 
only 3 people pointed to the card color as the unusual event. Specifically, they responded "some 384 
symbols were not the usual color", "the suites", and "changed colors is all and I lost at lot". Most 385 
other comments were an attempt to explain the users’ particular results, identifying that they won 386 
or lost more than they should have, and suggesting either that the dealer cheated or their betting 387 
pattern affected the result (none of which was the case). 388 
As with study 1, we present both the conventional frequentist and Bayesian analysis. For 389 
the frequentist approach, we ran a single regression model, with the intercept at the control 390 
condition and each experimental condition dummy coded separately. The effects for condition 391 
are small and mostly non-significant: mortality salience B = .10[-.17, .36], p = .48; cards B = 392 
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.07[-.22, .35], p = .65; both threats B = .31[.05, .57], p = .02. From a frequentist perspective, 393 
these results are quite deflating, but they shouldn't be. All three effect-size point-estimates are 394 
within a sensible range, given our expectations for the true effect size (i.e. somewhere between -395 
.20, and .60). A Bayesian analysis that estimates the effect in the context of our expectations will 396 
tell a slightly different story. 397 
 We used the same relatively flat priors for the mean and standard deviation of the sample, 398 
but updated our estimate of the effect to M = .23, SD = .19. Results offer a similar interpretation, 399 
in that we are only confident the double meaning threat condition produced a non-zero effect 400 
(See Fig 2 for prior and posterior distributions and, see Table 1 for parameter estimates; the 401 
interpretation is similar to the conventional analysis). However, because we were willing to be 402 
wrong in the face of either negative or very large positive effects, the Bayesian approach more 403 
strongly supports the existence of the effect, with confidence intervals that do not extend so far 404 
into the negative range. Confidence intervals are generally smaller, because the estimated effects 405 
are within our prior expectations based on study 1. Assessing the confidence of these effects 406 
against the belief that any effect size is possible would be to put ourselves back in a position of 407 
ignorance.  408 
 409 
Table 1. Study 2 Parameter estimates for the Bayesian regression model. 410 
Parameter Mean (SD) 95% interval 
Intercept -.16 (.08) [-.32, .00] 
M. Salience .14 (.10) [-.06, .34] 
Reverse cards .12 (.11) [-.10, .34] 
Both manipulation .32 (.10) [.12, .52] 
 19 
Sigma .99(.03) [.93, 1.05] 
 411 
Fig 2. Prior vs posterior distribution for each of the 3 conditions. (A) mortality salience, (B) 412 
reverse cards, (C) both manipulations. Red distribution is the prior probability of the effect, 413 
green is the posterior distribution which accounts for study data. Solid region represents the 95% 414 
probability window, shaded regions are outside this window. 415 
We can reach a number of conclusions with the Bayesian approach that are more difficult 416 
from a frequentist framing. A) Our two studies have produced effect sizes within tolerance of 417 
each other. B) The effect size is likely smaller than our first study suggested; effect sizes that 418 
could produce the distributions in both studies 1 and 2 are unlikely to be larger than .3. C) 419 
despite the single threat conditions being not significant using either frequentist or Bayesian 420 
analyses, we are nonetheless more confident that an effect exists. 421 
Study 3 422 
 423 
Using the same strategy in study 3, we updated our prior expectations to match a 424 
posterior distribution from study 2, blending the null and experimental models based on their 425 
evidential weight. Given that we have effect estimates for each type of meaning threat now, we 426 
estimated separate prior distributions for each condition in line with their coefficient and 427 
standard deviation. Again, the practical effect of the new priors is that effect sizes between -.05 428 
and .35 will be interpreted as more likely. 429 
 Descriptive statistics for scores on the DV for each condition: control N = 47, M = .58, 430 
SD = .28; mortality salience N = 38, M = .57, SD = .24; cards N = 46, M = .70, SD = .26; both 431 
manipulations N = 43, M = .69, SD = .26 (8 participants were removed because the experimenter 432 
noted a problem during collection). Looking at effect sizes within the frequentist regression 433 
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model, we find that mortality salience has an effect in the opposite direction as predicted B = -434 
.05[-.47, .37], p = .83. The other two conditions are significant in the expected direction: cards B 435 
= .47[.07, .87], p = .02, both manipulations B = .44[.03, .84], p = .04. However, the cards 436 
condition is arguably an over-estimate. Given the previous studies, it is unrealistic to take the 437 
point estimate of .44 at face value as representing the true underlying effect. 438 
Comparing to the Bayesian model, we find the first clear example of the two analysis 439 
strategies diverging (See Fig 3 for prior and posterior distributions, and Table 2 for parameter 440 
estimates). Despite the cards and duel threat conditions showing strong effects in the 441 
conventional analysis, the Bayesian regression estimates that a more moderately sized effect 442 
likely underlies the data, given the current data and our prior expectations. Likewise, although 443 
the mortality salience group has a lower working memory score than the control group, our 444 
estimate of the underlying effect is still positive (with a confidence tail that extends farther into 445 
the negative space). However, note also that our confidence interval of the effect has not reduced 446 
at the rate of the previous studies. Relative to the amount of data from the previous studies, the 447 
current study with its smaller sample only provided a minor contribution. In this way, it is 448 
possible to add a large number of studies with relatively small N to the analysis; smaller samples 449 
that don't match the prior distribution pose less of a direct challenge to our initial assumptions. 450 
Likewise, small samples that agree with our prior assumptions don't necessarily help us shorten 451 
our confidence intervals. 452 
 453 
Table 2. Study 3 parameter estimates based on Bayesian regression model. 454 
Parameter Mean (SD) 95% interval 
Intercept -.16 (.08) [-.32, .00] 
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M. Salience .07 (.09) [-.11, .25] 
Reverse cards .23 (.09) [.05, .41] 
Both manipulations .34 (.09) [.16, .52] 
Sigma .98 (.05) [.89, 1.08] 
 455 
Fig 3. Prior vs posterior distribution for each of the 3 conditions. (A) mortality salience, (B) 456 
cards, (C) both manipulations. Red distribution is the prior probability of the effect, green is the 457 
posterior distribution which accounts for study data. Solid region represents the 95% probability 458 
window, shaded regions are outside this window. 459 
 460 
Study 4  461 
 462 
Priors for effect sizes were updated based on the posterior distribution of study 3. 463 
Descriptive statistics on digit span scores for each condition are: Control N= 81, M = .50, SD = 464 
.27; mortality salience N = 92, M = .53, SD = .23; reversed cards N = 95, M = .59, SD = .19; both 465 
manipulations N = 80, M = .53, SD = .23 (53 participants were removed either due to technical 466 
errors that led to missing dependent variable values, for failing one of our quality checks, or 467 
because they admitted to cheating during the debriefing). The conventional analysis indicates 468 
that only the cards condition produced a significant effect: mortality salience B = .11[-.19, .41], p 469 
= .46; reverse cards B = .37[.08, .67], p = .02; both manipulations B = .09[-.22, .39], p = .58. 470 
Given what we know about past effect size estimates from these manipulations, the current 471 
confidence intervals are needlessly pessimistic when taken out of context. 472 
  When considering the results from a Bayesian perspective, the final posterior 473 
distributions are more optimistic. Based on the current sample and evidence, in combination with 474 
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our expectations for the likely window containing the effect size, both the cards condition and 475 
the dual meaning threat condition likely represent a moderate sized effect (See Fig 4 for prior 476 
and posterior distributions, and Table 3 for parameter estimates). The bulk of the probability 477 
space is also in the small and positive direction for mortality salience, though the 95% 478 
confidence interval crosses zero. 479 
 480 
Table 3. Study 4 parameter estimates from Bayesian regression model. 481 
Parameter Mean (SD) 95% interval 
Intercept -.16 (.06) [-.28, -.04] 
M. Salience .09 (.07) [-.04, .23]  
Reverse cards .30 (.07) [.16, .43] 
Both manipulation .24 (.07) [.10, .38] 
Sigma .99 (.04) [.92, 1.06] 
 482 
Fig 4. Prior vs posterior distribution for each of the 3 conditions. (A) mortality salience, (B) 483 
reversed cards, (C) both manipulations. Red distribution is the prior probability of the effect, 484 
green is the posterior distribution which accounts for study data. Solid region represents the 95% 485 
probability window, shaded regions are outside this window. 486 
 487 
Follow-up  488 
 489 
 The two analysis approaches lead to somewhat different conclusions in the final analysis. 490 
Although we would also conclude with frequentist statistics that a small effect likely exists based 491 
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on meta-analysis (See Fig 5 for a meta-analysis), it is difficult to see that effect emerge with each 492 
study, starting with flat priors in each analysis.  493 
 494 
Fig 5. Meta-analytic forest plot of all experimental effects. Squares are positioned based on 495 
the standardized regression coefficient, size is in relation to sample size. Bars represent 95% 496 
confidence interval. The large diamond is the meta-analytic average and confidence of the true 497 
underlying effect.  498 
Emphasizing whether our point estimate has confidence intervals that do not cross zero is 499 
also demoralizing, likely unreasonably so given the small size of the effect. For example, based 500 
on the Bayesian interpretation we are confident that the effect of the cards manipulation causes 501 
an increase somewhere between .16 and .43 standard deviations on the working memory task. 502 
However, we also know (because we defined it) that the sample these estimates were drawn from 503 
has a standard deviation of 1. It would be very easy to draw a sample that does not reveal the 504 
effect, or shows the opposite. This leads to the question of replication: What would qualify as a 505 
successful replication (or refutation of our finding) and how large a sample would one need? The 506 
answer is different for either frequentist or Bayesian thinking. From a frequentist perspective, we 507 
would like our 2-condition replication experiment to produce a significant difference. Simulating 508 
studies of N = 50 per condition (1 000 simulations) and increasing by 50, we can see how large a 509 
sample is needed to achieve 80% power for finding this effect (See Table 4 for parameter 510 
estimates).  511 
 512 
Table 4. Power to detect the true effect of .16 - .43 513 
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N per condition Power % significant 
but wrong 
% point estimate within CI 
for all simulations 
50 .33 .79 .50 
100 .52 .36 .64 
150 .75 .17 .78 
200 .84 .13 .83 
250 .91 .09 .85 
300 .96 .05 .92 
N, number of participants in each condition of 2-condition test (control vs. meaning threat); 514 
Power, percentage of simulated regressions that produce a significant effect for meaning threat; 515 
% significant but wrong, the percentage of the significant results that yielded an effect size that is 516 
outside our expected effect size range of .16 to .43; % point estimate within CI, percentage of all 517 
the simulated trials (whether significant or not) that yield a point-estimate of the effect within our 518 
posterior expectations of .16 - .43. Each sample size was simulated 1000 times.  519 
 First thinking about conventional replication. With a sample of 50 participants per 520 
condition (what used to be the gold standard) we would have 33% power to detect the effect. 521 
However, nearly 80% our significant effect size estimates would be outside the range of the real 522 
effect, mostly over-estimating the effect due to chance sampling fluctuations. To achieve 80% 523 
power, we would need just under N = 200 per condition (400 participants for a 2-condition 524 
study), though even then more than 10% of our significant results will have over- or under-525 
estimated the effect. But then again, do we need to replicate in a single study that the effect is 526 
"not zero"? This is an uninteresting and actually far more vague prediction than "the true effect is 527 
within .16 and .43". The latter prediction is more precise, and theoretically more meaningful (i.e. 528 
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we are claiming the effect exists, and that we are quite confident that it is fairly small to 529 
moderate in size). A better bar for replicating would be a study that produces a point-estimate of 530 
the effect size within our confidence interval. While in the case of our results, both approaches 531 
would require just under N = 200 per condition, focusing on the effect size will keep the required 532 
sample at roughly this size even for smaller effects, while the sample needed for significance can 533 
increase dramatically. Additionally, it lets us shift the conversation away from not-zero towards 534 
"how sure are we of the effect size"? At that sample size, estimates close to zero give us pause 535 
that perhaps the effect is not real, and effects larger than .39 suggest that perhaps population or 536 
methodological factors may moderate the effect. In either case, the new data can be used to 537 
update our priors, helping us to shift and adjust our confidence appropriately.  538 
Discussion 539 
 540 
Four studies investigated the relationship between uncertainty and working memory 541 
capacity. In the first study, we measured performance on a word span (working memory) task 542 
after participants were exposed to either senseless or sensible word pairs. The results of this 543 
study suggested either a small effect, or no effect, of uncertainty on working memory capacity. 544 
In Study 2, we detected a similarly small effect using an Mturk sample. We employed different 545 
manipulations including a blackjack game with reversed-cards, a mortality salience prime, and a 546 
condition that combined both uncertainty primes (dual meaning threat). Study 3 employed the 547 
same manipulations as Study 2, but introduced a new DV; a digit span task in which participants 548 
recalled long strings of numbers. The mortality salience condition had an effect in the opposite 549 
direction, and the other two conditions were significant in the expected direction. Altogether, the 550 
findings from the third study were consistent with a small positive effect. Study 4 was a direct 551 
replication of Study 3 using an Mturk sample, in which a moderate effect of the reversed cards 552 
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condition and the dual meaning threat on working memory capacity. Taken together, we are 553 
reasonably confident that the true effect size for the reverse-cards manipulation, and the two 554 
uncertainty manipulations together, are small to moderate. We are less confident about the 555 
mortality salience condition, and are not confident that presenting the two uncertainty 556 
manipulations together (cards and mortality salience) makes the effect stronger. Ultimately, we 557 
were able to conclude that we are dealing with an effect that is non-zero but discouragingly 558 
difficult to detect. We advise that future studies use a much larger sample size of N=200 per 559 
group to overcome this difficulty.  560 
Our interpretation is that the importance of these studies lies in their ability to provide 561 
theoretical context for a phenomenon observed in a diverse set of literatures; namely, that people 562 
experience an increase in their ability to learn and process information when they encounter an 563 
uncertain event (see [17,36,37], see also [38,39]). Specifically, we are able to conclude that 564 
working memory capacity is one executive function that may contribute to this increase. 565 
Therefore, we posit that the findings from the present set of studies represent an important new 566 
direction in uncovering the cognitive mechanisms that allow people to learn more about their 567 
environment when confronted with uncertainty.  568 
Our findings also shed light on some ambiguities in the threat compensation literature. 569 
Because we used a diverse set of uncertainty manipulations (mortality salience, reverse-colored 570 
playing cards, and senseless word pairs) we may conclude that counter to other theories in the 571 
threat compensation literature (see [17,37]) this pattern-seeking behavior is not specific to 572 
solving the source of uncertainty; rather, it is a nonspecific attempt to re-establish order in the 573 
environment. While there is still some doubt about the strength of the mortality salience 574 
manipulation, our other manipulations—which are in fact harder to explain with alternative 575 
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theories because they operate implicitly—show convergent results. 576 
It is important to note that our findings do not suggest that uncertainty always leads to 577 
increased working memory capacity. Indeed, there is reason to believe that people resolve threats 578 
to certainty in many different ways. Greater attentional control is a feature of abstraction, which 579 
is only one of the proposed mechanisms by which people reduce the negative arousal associated 580 
with uncertainty. We speculate that the size of the effect may reflect a general preference for 581 
other anxiety-reducing strategies; for example, people have been known to affirm existing 582 
schemas in order to compensate for perceived meaninglessness in another domain (e.g., [7,9]). A 583 
future study may involve multiple uncertainty-reducing tasks, and a comparison of the effects 584 
obtained for each. Future studies should also determine if anxiety is indeed the source of all of 585 
these behaviours. More narrowly, future research should determine if anxiety mediates the 586 
relationship between uncertainty and working memory, using indicators of autonomic arousal 587 
such as skin conductance. 588 
There are a number of limitations to the studies presented here. The small effect size 589 
suggests that the exact mechanism by which all of these changes in attention occur is still 590 
unknown. Indeed, there is no firm evidence that the many cognitive and attitudinal changes in 591 
processing that follow threats to meaning can be attributed to working memory capacity and not 592 
a related mechanism. For example, though we find evidence for changes in working memory in 593 
the present research, the working memory tasks we employ may be somewhat idiosyncratic, 594 
measuring constructs that are related to, but distinct from, working memory. That is, both the 595 
digit span task (used in studies 3 and 4) and the operation span task (used in studies 1 and 2) 596 
require that participants retrieve information from memory rather than engage in simple 597 
attentional control. On the other hand, the most common definition of working memory is a 598 
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construct that involves multiple mechanisms for organizing and manipulating information [889] 599 
as well as retrieving information from secondary memory [89,90], these task-related 600 
idiosyncrasies become less of a concern (indeed, they may provide the best test of our hypothesis 601 
that discrepancies affect working memory, rather than smaller dissociable mechanisms that 602 
underlie working memory). Furthermore, both the digit span task and the operation span task 603 
represent the most commonly-used and straightforward measures of working memory capacity 604 
[91,92,93] indicating that at the very least, these tasks reflect the underlying construct reasonably 605 
well. Therefore, we have some reason to suspect that working memory, as opposed to related 606 
constructs, is the mechanism at play in the current research, although we acknowledge that it 607 
remains to be seen whether the same pattern of results would be found for all measures of 608 
working memory. 609 
Another concern with the present research is that our small effects may indicate that there 610 
are untested moderators dampening this effect. To address the latter possibility, we suggest that 611 
future studies determine if individual differences moderate this relationship; for example, 612 
differences in approach and avoidance motivation, which have been found to predict the strength 613 
of responses to threat (e.g., [94,95]). 614 
We also acknowledge that the present studies do not provide imaging or 615 
psychophysiological data to speak to our proposed mechanism: activation in the ACC caused by 616 
threat, leading to increased working memory capacity. Future research  employing fMRI or EEG  617 
could determine if ACC activation is indeed implicated in the relationship between threat and 618 
working memory capacity. 619 
It is also unclear how well our findings would generalize to other samples. However, we 620 
managed to find similar effects among Canadian undergraduates and an American sample over 621 
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Mturk. We therefore speculate that the results generalize to diverse populations, although we 622 
suggest that future studies use non-Western samples as well. It is also difficult to determine if 623 
working memory capacity is increased consciously or unconsciously. An unconscious account 624 
fits better with past results of meaning threats enhancing implicit pattern learning [38,39]; 625 
however, it remains possible that some people may have explicit awareness of their greater 626 
attentional focus. Future studies can include measures of attentional control that have been 627 
known to be processed explicitly rather than implicitly, or vice versa.  628 
Despite these limitations, our findings serve as evidence that uncertainty leads people to 629 
pay more attention to information in the environment. In uncovering one of the mechanisms 630 
governing this effect; attentional control improving working memory; we provide some direction 631 
for the study of meaning-making and how people navigate an increasingly confounding world.  632 
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